The U.S. Government now has a $16 trillion deficit. On the other hand, it
made about $12 billion on the AIG stock sale - congrats. To put those numbers
in context, however, the government would
have to do an AIG deal every day, seven days a week, for nearly four years in
order to erase the current deficit.
As John Steinbeck famously said, the
problem with poor Americans is that "they don't believe they're poor, but
rather temporarily embarrassed millionaires." Has the housing market been
"temporarily" down? One can never overestimate the intelligence of
the masses, but the Financial Times reports that "Americans' confidence
in the outlook for the housing market has risen and they believe home
prices will continue to rise in the next year, according to a new survey by
Fannie Mae." Better than believing otherwise, right? "A rising number
of people predicted mortgage rates would go up in the next 12 months, up to 40%
last month from 36% in July, while those who felt it was a good time to sell
property increased to 18 per cent from 16 per cent. The number of people
surveyed who predicted house prices would increase remained steady in August at
35%, but was up from 20% a year ago. Americans expect house prices will rise on
average by 1.6% in the next year."
The industry continues to wring their collective hands over the guarantee
fee increase. (I've been in the biz so long, I remember when there was a
"guarantee fee" and a "guarantor fee", depending on the
agency.) I received a note from an industry vet, saying, in part, "The
biggest fear in our industry right now is not rising rates but that FNMA and
FHMLC, already in receivership, have been given a death sentence with no chance
of parole. It sadly appears to many of us that, no matter how reformed and
beneficial the GSE's are to the health of housing market and our economy in
general, they are going to subjected to a slow and painful death. The lethal
injections may have already been started."
The note continued. "Case in point, the latest G-fee increase of .125% has
already added a full 50 bps to our price on 60 day locks. I have also heard
that FNMA that they are also capping the amount of loans that new FNMA approved
seller/servicers can send directly to FNMA by capping production at 20x
their net worth. So, for example, if we have a net worth of $10 million, we can
only sell FNMA $200 million for the entire year. But we just closed nearly
$100 million in August alone so we have no choice but to send in loans as a
correspondent to the aggregators, and they in turn service the loans, steal our
customers, and sell to FNMA without those caps in place as they are an
established seller servicer. But wait, the fun doesn't end! With the impending
Basel III reserve requirements possibly hitting even the 'too big to fail banks'
in the upcoming years, there is a fear that they too will start to shrink their
loan balance portfolios. This redirects us to sell loans to the agencies, which
have us capped out!"
Here are my thoughts on this. First, a clarification that the gfee
increase may result in approximately 50 basis points difference in price, not
rate (using a 4x1 multiple).
Second, FHFA indicated that the gfee increase was intended to help flatten out
the price difference between big and small lenders. If the average is 10 basis
points, and the large aggregators saw 12, that means to move back to the
average, by my simple calculations, plenty of "smaller guys" will see
less than 10.
Third, the guarantee fee is intended to cover expected risk inherent in
eligible deliveries. Even at the current gfee levels, it was generally
agreed that Fannie & Freddie have been underpricing the risk on eligible
loans, with support of the Government and FHFA wanted that to change.
(More on how g-fees are set, and some theories about possible future increases,
below.)
As it relates to these repurchases, no one is going to disagree that lender
have to be financially able to repurchase ineligible loans. If you don't think
monitoring counterparty risk is a huge issue, just ask the CFPB, or Capital One
after it paid some hefty fines for exactly that issue. Fannie needs to manage
counterparty risk, and one way to do that is by limiting deliveries based on
net worth and other factors. The 20:1 ratio you reference, based on net worth,
is known to be merely a starting point.
But folks are asking, "How was the delivery limit set?"
It appears that Fannie took, as a starting point, the net worth of the company.
For newly approved lenders, it is hard to gauge what future deliveries will
look like, but for more seasoned lenders, profile of deliveries and any
outstanding obligations (such as loans not repurchased) get factored into the
limit. Lenders who have delivered a better book of business to Fannie are
rewarded with a higher sales cap.
So what if you don't like the 20x1, or whatever ratio you might have, what
can a lender do? Call Fannie Mae and talk with them about it. Another is to
(gasp!) keep your earnings in the firm rather than taking them out. Per
the MBA, independent mortgage banks' margins are very good
(http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/81793.htm), so now is a great
time to bump up the net worth of the company. Owners pulling out large chunks
of capital in order to shield it from potential liabilities down the road may
see this strategy backfire with lower delivery limits based on that reduced net
worth. Another strategy is to be willing to post collateral as an alternative
to increasing net worth. I've heard that putting some of that liquid net
worth into an escrow/custodial account might increase whatever delivery limit
is set.
So, don't be afraid to have a conversation with Fannie about your limits.
And by the way, with all this talk about Fannie, let's not forget Freddie. My
guess is that the FHFA gave both agencies directives, and how Fannie and
Freddie implement is up to that particular agency. So watch for Freddie to come
out with something similar.
Returning to the g-fee hike, how did the FHFA arrive at that level of
increase, and how will increases be determined in the future? The FHFA,
looking at Freddie & Fannie's portfolio performance, realized there were
performance issues based on maturity, FICO, LTV, and several other factors.
Underwriters knew this already, right? Most analysts who follow such things
think that the G-Fee hikes should be positive for lower coupon 30 year pools,
which will experience the biggest valuation upside. Although the FHFA has not
announced full details, the market anticipates fee hikes on weaker credit
borrowers, which should increase the price for existing pools so investors liked
the news, even if lenders and borrowers did not: investors will hold onto the
higher yielding pools longer. (Although just like we saw in March, the market
will see a rush of refi's ahead of various investor deadlines, which in turn
are based on how long it takes to pool and securitize the loans.)
Returning to the nitty-gritty, the g-fee hikes will reduce cross-subsidization
of high risk loans by increasing pricing for loans with maturities greater than
15 years. The cash window will implement these changes for commitments starting
on November 1. Differences in g-fees between lenders delivering large volumes
to the GSEs and smaller lenders will also be reduced. Folks "in the know" say
that separately, the FHFA will also publish a proposal for state level pricing
for public input.
But all this still begs the question, "What is a private market
g-fee?" Under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, the FHFA
is required to conduct annual studies of the g-fees charged by the GSEs and
submit a report to Congress. The FHFA uses loan level data from the GSEs
segmented by product type, LTV, credit score, and size of lender for the
purposes of this report. Each agency's proprietary costing model is then used
to estimate cost due to guarantee payments and the expected return on capital.
"Private money" does not necessarily have access to this data. For
F&F, the current and future g-fee is based on the projected g-fee cash
inflows: is fee income sufficient to offset the cost involved in guaranteed loans,
as well as the required return on capital. Makes sense to me, although one can
only guess at the exact "private money gfee."
Traditionally, smaller lenders pay higher g-fees due to the perceived higher
cost of doing business with them. MBS hedging costs borne by the GSEs (as
smaller lenders are more likely to deliver to the cash window), liquidity
disadvantages, higher effect of fixed administrative costs, and higher
counterparty risks are included in those costs. And historically larger lenders
are also usually able to negotiate down their g-fees: U.S. Bank does not have
the same g-fee as Rob's Home Mortgage and Laundromat. But recent reports show
that the higher fees charged of smaller lenders are disproportionate to the
higher costs. In the future, don't be surprised if the agencies come out
with either an entirely different structure, or take the current structure and
use more loan-level price attributes to set the g-fees to better model the
risk.
By the way, yesterday the commentary mentioned the new rep & warrant framework that clarifies future liabilities (read: reasons lenders are asked to buyback loans). Here is the actual announcement.
Turning to the temporal markets, Tuesday saw little change in prices (the 10-yr was down about .125 and closed at 1.70% and agency MBS prices were worse about 1/16 in price) on less-than average volume. Chatter in the press focused on the 3-yr auction (just fine), today's $21 billion 10-yr auction, and miscellaneous news from Europe. Today begins one of the periodic Federal Open Market Committee meetings ("ok...who took the last jelly glazed...Ben wanted it!") and the market seems to be positioning for QE3 information from the Fed later this week: mortgage pricing is doing better than Treasury pricing.
In the early going, unfortunately, rates have edged higher: the 10-yr has crept up to 1.74% and MBS prices are worse by .125-.250.
An American tourist in London decides to skip his tour group and explore the
city on his own.
He wanders around, seeing the sights, and occasionally stopping at a quaint pub
to soak up the local culture, chat with the lads, and have a pint of the Local
Favorite.
After a while, he finds himself in a very high class neighborhood - big,
stately residences - no pubs, no stores, no restaurants, and worst of all... NO
PUBLIC RESTROOMS.
He really, really has to go, after all those Brews.
He finds a narrow side street, with high walls surrounding the adjacent
buildings and decides to use the wall to solve his problem.
As he is unzipping, he is tapped on the shoulder by a London Bobbie, who says,
"Sir, you simply cannot do that here, you know."
"I'm very sorry, officer," replies the American, "but I really,
really HAVE TO GO, and I just can't find a public restroom."
"Ah, yes," said the Bobbie "Just follow me." He leads him
to a back "delivery alley," then along a wall to a gate, which he
opens. "In there," points the Bobbie. "Whiz away... anywhere you
want."
The fellow enters and finds himself in the most beautiful garden he has ever
seen.
Manicured grass lawns, statuary, fountains, sculptured hedges, and huge beds of
gorgeous flowers, all in perfect bloom.
Since he has the cop's blessing, he zips down and unburdens himself and is
greatly relieved.
As he goes back thru the gate, he says to the Bobbie, "That was really
decent of you - is that "English Hospitality?"
"No," replied the Bobbie, with a satisfied smile on his face,
"that is the German Embassy."